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CHAPTER 4

I Playing Fair with Imprisonment
RICHARD DAGGER

Introduction
This chapter rests on two assumptions, .at least one of which is controversial.1 The first is that something is wrong when a society imprisons as
many people as the United States now does. According to a widely published columnist, George Will, the rate of imprisonment was about 100
per 100,000 Americans until the 1970s. Since then the rate has shot up, to
the point where "700 per 100,000" are now in prison; "America," Will reported in 2013, "has nearly 5 percent of the world's population but almost
25 percent of its prisoners."2 It is possible, of course, that these figures are
just where they ought to be, or even too low. When a professed conservative such as Will takes them to be alarming, however, there seems little
need to defend the assumption that something is amiss.
The second assumption is that the principle of fair play underpins the
justification of legal punishment. This assumption is clearly controversial,
for only a few scholars nowadays justify punishment in terms of fair play. 3
For present purposes, however, I shall simply point to the defenses I have
offered elsewhere and respond to criticisms of the fair-play approach only
in passing. 4 In effect, I shall be presenting an oblique defense of this approach by demonstrating how it provides a helpful way of addressing the
problem of excessive incarceration. In doing so, I shall also address the
concern that democratic societies are especially prone to this problem because of their tendency to foster what has come to be known as penal
populism. My argument is that democracy leads to mass imprisonment
only when an otherwise democratic polity neglects what Albert Dzur calls
the "moral dimension" of democracy: "Because citizens are lawgivers

as well as law abiders, they have a special obligation in a republic to be
vigilant to the possibility that their laws are unfairly burdening some over
others, that their laws are exclusionary or discriminatory."5 Dzur makes
no explicit reference to the principle of fair play here or elsewhere in his
book, but I hope to show that the vigilance he calls for requires attention
to that principle.

Analyzing Excessive Incarceration
From a purely analytical point of view, there seem to be four possible reasons for excessive incarceration. These are:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Too many people are committing crimes.
Too many activities count as criminal.
Too many criminals are imprisoned.
Too many prisoners are imprisoned for too long.

Any one of these reasons, or any combination of them, could account for
overimprisonment, as a brief elaboration should make clear.
First, there is a sense in which the statement "too many people are committing crimes" is self-evidently true: even one crime is a crime too many.
If we proceed from some sense of what a normal or tolerable level of crime
is, however, we can make realistic judgments of whether we have reason
to worry that too many people are committing crimes. If such judgments
are warranted, we then need to ask why so many are engaging in criminal
activity, and one possibility is that some kind of social failure is at work.
This could be a failure of prevention in the straightforward sense of not
putting enough police on the streets, for example, or not training them
properly. Or it could be a failure to cultivate the appropriate attitudes of
respect for law and other persons through family discipline, civic education, and other forms of socialization. Or it could be a failure to provide
sufficient opportunities for people to live a decent life without resorting to
crime. In any or all of these ways, a society may unwittingly contribute to
the high crime rates that lead to high rates of incarceration.
The second analytical possibility-and probably the one scholars most
frequently cite-is that too many activities are classified as criminal. The
leading example of this tendency "to criminalize too much and to punish
too many," as Douglas Husak contends, is "the crime of illicit drug possession."6 "Nearly one of every five prisoners in America," he notes, "is
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behind bars for a nonviolent drug offense."7 Simply repealing the laws
that make the possession of various drugs illicit would apparently lead to
a significant drop in the rate of incarceration. But repealing such laws is
not a simple matter. In addition to the problem of persuading legislators
to take steps that may make them appear to be "soft on crime," there is
the difficulty of determining exactly what the law ought and ought not to
proscribe. This is a difficulty, though, that anyone who attributes mass incarceration to excessive criminalization must face. At the least, we should
acknowledge that the spirit of fair play cannot countenance much harsher
sentences for the possession of a relatively inexpensive drug, such as crack
cocaine, than for its possession in purer and more expensive forms.
To be sure, conviction of a criminal offense need not entail ~ prison
sentence. There are alternatives, such as probation, community service,
and restitution to the offender's victims. 8 That is why the third possible
reason for excessive incarceration is that too many criminals are imprisoned. Instead of locking up so many of them, perhaps we would do
better to punish offenders in another way. 9 Here, though, we face the difficulty of determining what kinds of crimes warrant what kinds of punitive
responses-of how to make the punishment fit the crime, in the standard
phrase. Hardly anyone would say that supervised community service is
proper punishment for a serial killer or that a prison term is fitting for
someone who steals an apple from a store (setting aside possible threestrikes-and-you're out complications). 10 There are plenty of hard cases
between these extremes, however, and some principled means of sorting
them out will be required if we are to reduce incarceration.
Similar considerations bear on the fourth possibility. If we believe that
excessive incarceration is largely the result of too many prisoners being imprisoned for too long, then we will need to find some way to determine the
proper length of the sentences that attach to the various crimes warranting
imprisonment. We will also need reasons for deciding whether determinate
sentencing or mandatory-minimum sentences or three-strikes-and-you'reout laws, all of which may boost the length of prison terms, are justified.
We will need, in short, a theory of criminal law and punishment.
Such a theory will not provide straightforward answers to every practical question that arises with regard to mass incarceration. No theory can
tell us exactly how many days, months, or years is condign punishment
for a certain criminal. Theories do provide necessary guidance, however,
perhaps most notably by focusing our attention on a certain consideration,
such as one or the other of those venerable rivals, deterrence or retribution, or by promising a harmonious blend of the two. In the remainder
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of this chapter, I shall try to show how the principle of fair play provides
such guidance. In particular, I shall try to show how it grounds a theory of
criminal law and punishment that is broadly retributive, communicative,
and sensitive to democratic considerations. This last point is important
because of the previously mentioned worry that democracy, in the form of
penal populism, is somehow to blame for mass incarceration. Indeed, all
but the first of the four analytical possibilities I have traced may well stem
from the popularity of "get tough" policies as responses to crime. 11 If so,
then it will be necessary "to educate democracy," as Tocqueville said, in
order to resolve the problem of mass incarceration. 12 Reinforcing the value
of fair play is essential to this education.

Crime, Punishment, and Fair Play
As children are quick to learn, any activity that requires cooperation is
likely to give rise to complaints of unfairness. Sometimes the complaint
will be about the unfairness of those who do not do their part; at other
times it will focus on the supposedly unfair distribution of the benefits
that cooperation produces. In either case the core idea is that cooperative activities provide benefits to the participants, with the benefits ranging
from the pleasure of playing a game to those of sharing in the profits of a
commercial enterprise or enjoying the protection afforded by a system of
mutual defense. These benefits are not without costs, however, and those
who participate in the activity are expected to bear a fair share of its burdens. Punishment enters the picture because cooperative endeavors usually produce the desired benefits even if some of the participants shirk
their responsibilities. To prevent these potential free riders from taking
advantage of the cooperative efforts of others, the participants invoke the
threat of punishment. When the threat is not successful, then actual punishment is justified because the offenders have violated the principle of
fair play.
For this account of fair play to provide a plausible theory of legal punishment, we must be able to conceive of a polity as a cooperative enterprisein John Rawls's words, as "a fair system of cooperation over time, from one
generation to the next." 13 To some extent this is to conceive of the polity as
an ideal, and some countries will fall so far short of the ideal that we cannot
reasonably judge their oppressed and exploited subjects to be participants
in cooperative practices that entail duties of fair play. To the extent that the
rule of law is in force, however, we can hold that a country's people are
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receiving the benefits of a cooperative enterprise and owe it to their fellow
citizens to bear a fair share of the burdens of the enterprise-that is, to obey
the law. 14 Everyone will find that obeying the law is at least occasionally
burdensome, but good citizens wiJI not leave it to others to shoulder this
burden while they ride free. To assure these citizens that their cooperative
efforts will not be in vain, those who break the law should be punished.
Much more needs to be said to fill out and defend this sketch of fairplay theory, but I can touch on only two points here. One is that violations of the law are not equal in weight or character. There is a difference
between civil and criminal disobedience, for instance, that any theory of
punishment should recognize. There is also a significant difference between offenses that are straightforward failures to play fair, such as tax
cheating, and crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery. Fair-play theory
can acknowledge these differences, however, while insisting that every
crime is in part a crime of unfairness-a failure to restrain one's conduct in
ways necessary for the success of "a fair. system of cooperation over time,
from one generation to the next." Although the severity of the punishment
should match the gravity of the crime, it is the offense against fair play
that justifies the legal authorities in administering the punishment. Some
wrongs are wrongs regardless of what the law says, of course, and others
are wrong only because the law says so. We need law and legal authorities
to define and pronounce wrongs of both kinds, however, lest we face the
"inconveniencies" of the state of nature, with its "irregular and uncertain
exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of
others," 15 or the hazards of a society riven by blood feuds and the private
enforcement of unsettled norms.
The second point to note is that fair-play theory is both retributive and
communicative. It is retributive because punishment is a way of paying
back those who do not play fair. Beyond retribution, fair play also calls
for the communication of disapproval to the offender, in part as a way of
reinforcing the importance to all participants of respecting the rules, but
also in hopes of encouraging the offender to regret the wrong done and
repair the damaged relationship with the law-abiding participants in the
practice. 16 This is to say that fair-play theory not only has the backwardlooking aspect characteristic of retributive approaches to punishment,
which insist that punishment should be imposed only on those who have
broken the law; it also has a forward-looking aspect usually associated
with consequentialist approaches. That is, fair-play theory holds that punishment must serve to maintain the polity as a fair system of cooperation
under law-or, more likely, to move the polity closer to that ideal.
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That is a point to be elaborated shortly. First, though, it will be useful to
apply this sketch of the argument from fair play to the four analytical considerations set out in the previous section. In doing so, I will be relying on
the example of fair play in sports. Whether games and sports are suitably
analogous to politics and law is a topic I tum to in the following section.
Regarding the first consideration-that is, the possibility that too many
crimes are being committed-the straightforward application of the principle of fair play suggests that crimes are like violations of the rules of a
game. If we find that the play of the game is suffering because too many
players are in the penalty box, or suspended, or outright expelled from
the sport, then we may want to know why so many players are opening
themselves to sanctions-and jeopardizing the sport as a whole-by violating the rules. If it seems that they are simply cheating in order to gain
an unfair advantage for themselves by free-riding on the cooperative efforts of others, then we will need to take the kinds of preventive steps
I mentioned earlier-that is, stepped-up policing of the game and efforts
to cultivate the sense of sportsmanship or fair play on which the game
depends. 17 But we should also consider whether there may be something
wrong with the rules themselves. There may be some rule, for example,
that works systematically to the advantage of some players or teams, and
the disadvantage of others, but is not important to the game itself. A case
in point could be a game in which the players must equip themselves and
only the wealthy can afford the most advanced equipment, thus giving
them a significant advantage while playing. If we find that violations of
the rules increase because less affluent players or teams are trying to compensate for their disadvantage, we should consider whether a change in the
rules regarding equipment may be in order. Fair play is largely a matter of
respecting the rules, to be sure, but we should not overlook the possibility
that rules may be more or less encouraging of fair play.
In the case of the second analytical consideration, we may think of the
possibility that too many activities are counted as criminal by way of an
analogy with a sport that imposes too many rules on its players. Sports
leagues and associations typically regulate the kind of clothing and gear
players may wear, for example, and they do so in some cases for reasons
closely related to the play of the game itself-not allowing football players to wear clothing studded with metal spikes or baseball pitchers to wear
mirrors that reflect light into the batters' eyes-and in other cases for reasons that have little or no bearing on its play. Some clothing regulations
aim at insuring that players project what the league officials think is the
proper image; others ban clothing that advertises a product not approved
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by, or contributing to the coffers of, the league. Players who break these
rules have been penalized in various ways for their activities, even though
the activities seem to have no bearing on the play of the game. Is this fair?
Are the nonconformist players taking unfair advantage of the players who
conform to the regulations? Or would the sport benefit if rules that are not
truly necessary to the play of the game were eliminated? Is it possible that
an excess of rules-especially rules that seem petty, trivial, or pointlesswill in fact undermine the sport by leading players to lose respect for the
rules of the game? If the answer to these last two questions is "yes," then
the rules in question should be abolished. 18
What of the third analytical consideration-that is, the possibility that
too many criminals are being imprisoned? In this case the analogy with a
game raises questions about the severity of offenses and penalties. There
are many offenses that occur inadvertently in the course of play, usually
called "fouls," and in some cases players are allowed to accumulate fouls
until they reach a set number, at which_point they have "fouled out" and
are expelled from the game. But some fouls are considered worse than
others, such as intentional fouls, and some intentional fouls__:flagrant
fouls, in particular-may be cause for immediate ejection from the game
and perhaps suspension from future games. There are also offenses against
the referees, umpires, and officials who supervise the play of the game
to make sure that the rules are followed--0ffenses that can pose a direct
threat to fair play. It is no surprise, then, that those who govern sports
leagues and associations devote considerable attention to determining the
appropriate penalties for the various offenses that arise in the course of
play. Nor is it surprising that the gauge they typically employ is the tendency of the penalty to assure the fair play of the game.
This same point carries over to the final consideration, which is that
too many prisoners may be imprisoned for too long. In the case of sports,
the question is not only whether some rule breakers are treated unfairly
but also whether they are punished too severely for the good of the sport
itself. Gambling presents a case in point. Both players and spectators need
to believe in the fair play of the game, but it is difficult to sustain that
belief when there are reasonable suspicions of "point shaving" or attempts
to "throw"-that is, deliberately lose-a game or match in exchange for
money from gamblers. As a result, sports organizations typically have rules
that limit the gambling of those involved in the sport, or even prohibit contact with gamblers. Violations of these rules have led to suspensions for
lengthy periods, even to the point of banishment for life. The result may
be to promote confidence in the fair play of the game, but there also may
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be reason to question the justice of the sanctions imposed on people who
may have failed to understand or appreciate what they were doing-as in
the case of "Shoeless Joe" Jackson of baseball's notorious Chicago "Black
Sox" Scandal of 1919. There are also reasons to question the wisdom,
and fairness, of penalties that remove excellent players from competition.
Surely those who grievously violate the rules deserve punishment; that is
the retributive aspect of fair play. But they should be punished in a way,
and to an extent, that holds the promise of restoring the offenders, when
possible, to the status of full participants in the game. That is part of the
communicative aspect of fair play.
This last point suggests a direct connection to one controversial question about what constitutes fair or unfair treatment of criminal offenders.
I refer here to the question of whether convicted felons should lose their
voting rights while serving their sentences, and perhaps even forever. Fairplay theorists may differ on the justice of disenfranchising felons while
they are in prison, but they will hold that fairness requires the restoration of voting rights to those who have served their time. Again, this is
in keeping with the communicative aspect of fair-play theory. Those who
have paid their debts to society-and presumably learned to appreciate the
importance of respecting the rule of law-should be restored to full citizenship in the polity. I return to this point below, when I defend disenfranchisement while imprisoned as an appropriate form of civic punishment.
This one example, however, is hardly typical of what the fair-play approach to the four analytical considerations reveals. In most cases, the
principle of fair play does not supply a clear and distinct answer to the
questions that follow from these considerations. But it does provide a unified approach to these questions that concentrates on the need to establish
and enforce rules, and punish those who break them, in order to secure
the fair play of the game. This still leaves us, though, with the question of
whether this approach has any real bearing on law and punishment in the
world beyond the sports arena.

Fair Play and the Polity
The question, in short, is whether the analogy between games and legal
systems is sound. After all, one might object, the polity is not a game.
The kinds of games I have been discussing take place within the larger
framework of a legal order, which means that the legal order cannot be understood simply as a game itself. If someone playing ice hockey stabs an
opponent with a knife, he has certainly failed to play fair; but we will not
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be content with sending him to the penalty box or even expelling him from
the game. Justice requires a legal response in this case, not one governed
by the rules of hockey. Moreover, the paradigm cases of crime-assault,
robbery, rape, murder-are not simply violations of the rules or failures of
fair play. To think of them as analogous to cheating in a game is to misunderstand them altogether. 19
These are serious objections. Before responding to them directly,
though, it is important to note the ways in which the analogy is illuminating. One way is that respect for the rules is vital to both the play of a game
and the survival of a polity. There may be political and legal systems in
which brute force seems to be the prevailing cause of obedience, but even
tyrants rely on some degree of respect for their authority. Besides, in any
system that professes to follow the rule of law, respect for the rules themselves is necessary. They need not be regarded as sacred or immutable, but
neither should the citizens dismiss the rules out of hand as nothing more
than arbitrary commands or regulations. ·When laws encourage that kind of
attitude, they stand in need of reform.
A second strength of the analogy between games and legal systems
is that the communicative aspect of rules and rule enforcement is vital
to both. Laws are guides to conduct, and they cannot serve that purpose
if they are not communicated to the people whose conduct they are supposed to guide. That is why Thomas Aquinas included promulgation
among the defining features of law. 20 Punishment, too, serves a communicative function, as I have noted. So much is as true of polities as
it is of games.
A third point of analogy-and one with particular significance for
democratic theory-is that both games and legal systems rely on the ideal
of equality. In competitive games, we do not expect that the competitors
always will be equally matched. We do want them to have an equal chance
to display their talents, however, as the familiar metaphor of the level playing field attests. The same is true within legal systems, where the ideal is
for everyone to be equal before (or in the eyes of) the law. In neither games
nor legal systems is the ideal always achieved, to be sure, and in some
cases the actuality is a travesty of the ideal. But we can only recognize it
as a travesty if we have the ideal to animate and inspire us.
These points connect to the principle of fair play in two ways. First,
they represent aspects of that principle. To play fair is to treat participants as equally worthy of respect qua participants in a cooperative, rulegovemed enterprise and to communicate to them both what the rules are
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and the consequences of violating them. Second, the three points of analogy indicate the public aspect of fair play. Rules and laws are matters
of public concern. They cannot guide conduct and contribute to the play
of the game, or the good order of a polity, if they are not made public.
Furthermore, they benefit from being made publicly-a point I return to in
the conclusion to this chapter.
But what of the two objections to the analogy on which fair-play theory
rests that I mentioned earlier? The short answer-I have offered longer
ones elsewhere21-is that the analogy need not be exact. It is true that the
political and legal system must be larger and more encompassing than any
of the games that take place within its boundaries. But that means that we
should think of the polity as a special kind of game-that is, as a super- or
meta-game that encompasses and governs other games and activities. It
is a cooperative practice nevertheless, even though we may occasionally
need to think of it as a meta-practice that is a necessarily public matter. 22
The second point in defense of the analogy has to do with the nature
of crime. Some crimes, according to the objection, are indeed violations
of fair play. Tax evasion is a standard example, and some would include
mala prohibita offenses in general. 23 For mala in se offenses, however,
considerations of fair play are simply beside the point. My short answer is
to concede that fair play does not capture the full wrongfulness of murder,
rape, robbery, and assault, but to insist that it need not do so. What fair
play does is to justify the legal punishment of the wrongdoers, whose
actions not only injure their specific victims but threaten the cooperative
order in general. That is why punishment is in the hands of "the authorities." Moreover, considerations of fair play can also help us to understand
how some failures to play fair are more serious than others. The basketball player who intentionally fouls an opponent deserves a penalty; the
player who flagrantly fouls an opponent deserves a harsher penalty; the
player who pulls a gun on an opponent deserves not only an extremely
harsh penalty from the game's officials but also punishment under the
laws of the meta-practice. There is a violation of fair play in each instance, but the violation is progressively more serious in the latter two
instances because the offender acts in such a way as to make it difficult
or impossible for his opponent to continue to participate in the game-or
even in the meta-practice of which the game is a part. Fair play may not
tell us everything we need to know about an offense, but it tells us enough
to justify legal punishment and to give us some sense of why some crimes
are worse than others.

PLAYING FAIR WITH IMPRISONMENT

I

69

Democracy, Fair Play, and Imprisonment
What, though, does this talk of games and fair play have to do with the
topics of this volume, democratic theory and excessive incarceration? One
answer is that fair-play considerations help to explain why we are right to
worry about the rates of imprisonment in the United States, and perhaps
elsewhere, these days. For we have reason to believe that we are falling
short of the standards implicit in the principle of fair play. When rates of
incarceration are as high as they have been recently, we must ask how
reasonable it is to regard the United States as a cooperative practice. Fairplay theory contains critical and aspirational elements, in other words, that
point toward an ideal of a fully fair practice and demand attention to the
ways in which a practice, including the meta-practice of the polity, falls
short of that ideal. Mass incarceration is evidence that there is much to
criticize in the current practice of criminal law in the United States.
Such criticism should lead us back .to the four analytical possibilities
I raised earlier. My claim is that fair play can help us to formulate responses to the problems that arise in all four cases. Are too many crimes
being committed? Yes, certainly, but it is far from clearthat spending more
money on policing is the only answer. More needs to be done to encourage
potential offenders to play fair by obeying the law and to provide them
with opportunities to participate more fully, and fairly, in their society.
Before we punish someone, as the philosopher T. H. Green long ago remarked, we should be sure that "the social organization in which a criminal has lived and acted is one that has given him a fair chance of not being
a criminal."24 Among other things, steps should be taken to reduce recidivism; for if it is true that too many crimes are being committed, it is also
true that the same people are committing many of them. From the standpoint of fair-play theory, a particularly promising effort to reduce recidivism is the "social enterprise approach" sponsored in the United Kingdom
by the Royal Society for the Arts, which aims to engage prisoners in paid
work for social enterprises while they are in custody, then to continue their
employment in a supervised Transition Zone before their full release into
society. 25
What of the other analytical considerations? Are too many activities
classified as criminal? Yes, certainly, to the point where the criminalization of activities that do not amount to violations of fair play is probably
undermining respect for law. Laws against gambling are a case in point,
and especially so when they exist alongside state-sponsored lotteries. If
we want to discourage people from risking their money on wagers, we
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should rely on education rather than coercion-and avoid the hypocrisy
of encouraging them to take their chances in public lotteries all the while.
Hypocrisy and unfairness also come quickly to mind with regard to drug
laws, and their highly unequal enforcement, in the United States. 26
Are too many convicted criminals imprisoned, as the third consideration
asks? Yes, because there are other forms of punishment that are likely to
do more to help criminals comprehend the cooperative nature of society
and their duties of fair play. Community service is especially worthy of
consideration, as is service that can provide some restitution to the particular victims of an offender's crimes. 27 And finally, are too many prisoners imprisoned for too long? Yes again, because of mandatory-minimum
sentences and laws such as three strikes that do little or nothing to restore
criminals to the status of law-abiding citizens-and less than nothing to
promote fairness in the form of keeping the punishment in proportion to
the offense. There is more, obviously, to be said to clarify and defend
every one of these responses, but the point for now is that fair play provides the orientation we need as we work toward the answers.
This orientation is complementary, moreover, to democratic theory.
Worries about penal populism have some basis in fact, in my view, but
only to the extent that a society is democratic in a simplistic and perhaps
corrupt way. On the simplistic view, democracy is merely a matter of majority rule, no matter how majority opinion is formed or what course it
takes. Taking this view to its extreme, today's majority could vote to deny
the franchise henceforward to those in today's minority, or even to enslave
them. No democratic theorist endorses this simplistic view, however, because it fails to respect the fundamental democratic commitment to equality, here understood as a right to the equal consideration of everyone's
interests. 28 If the problem of mass incarceration is in large part the result
of penal populism, it is because those who make the laws are playing to
an audience that is insufficiently concerned with equal considerationand therefore with playing fair. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to
speak of the corruption of democracy.
A well-functioning democracy, in contrast, is a cooperative enterprise.
It must have rules, and it must have means of dealing with those who break
the rules, including punishment. But the rules must be fair and so must
the punishment. One sign of their fairness is that they must aim to do only
what is necessary to secure and strengthen the cooperative enterprise. That
means, among other things, that punishment must proceed in a manner
that is likely to restore the offenders to full participation in the democracy.
Those who have paid their debts to society by undergoing punishment that
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communicates to them and their fellow citizens the importance of abiding
by the laws of a cooperative society ought to be able to regain the status of
full citizenship. Mass incarceration and high rates of recidivism are signs
that democracy in the United States is not proceeding in this manner-and
is not, therefore, the cooperative practice it ought to be.
This claim turns on a distinction between two conceptions of democracy. One is the conception on which I have been drawing, which takes democracy to be a cooperative venture aiming to realize a common good; the
other conception, and perhaps the more familiar and apparently realistic
one, takes democracy to be a kind of machine for aggregating the personal
preferences of the populace. The two conceptions share a commitment to
equality and fairness, but what counts as fairness differs from one conception to the other; and only the first generates a sense of fair play robust
enough to make clear the undemocratic character of mass incarceration.
The preference-aggregation conception of democracy is well known
from the writings of Joseph Schumpeter a.nd others who draw an analogy
between economic and electoral competition.29 As they see it, individual
citizens bring their preferences into the political arena in much the same
way that consumers enter the economic marketplace, with the primary
difference being the kind of currency in use. Otherwise, candidates and
parties compete for the voter's attention and support much as producers
of goods compete for the consumer's money. Once in office, successful
candidates do what they can to satisfy those who voted for them and to
attract new supporters whenever possible, all in the hope of being returned
to office at the next election. Not every voter wins, of course, in the sense
of seeing her preferred candidates elected to office; but everyone eligible
to vote at least has a chance to register her preferences, which the political
system aggregates first by way of electoral results and second by way of
the policies and laws enacted by those who win office.
What makes this preference-aggregation view a conception of democracy is its commitment to regarding everyone's preferences equally. You
may care enough to go to the polls and vote while I do not, but your vote
would count for no more than mine were I to cast one. Besides, my failure
to vote is itself a statement of my preferences: you prefer voting to other
activities available at the time, but I prefer other activities to voting. To be
sure, you may exercise more influence over the outcome than I do even
if I cast my vote, but that is probably because you expend more of your
other resources-time, persuasive power, and perhaps money-than I do
in the attempt to influence how others vote. So far as votes themselves are
concerned, in a majority-rule system you and I are equal not only to each
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other but to every other potential voter. 30 In that sense, the preferenceaggregation conception is clearly democratic.
It also reflects a sense of fairness. Just as fraud, theft, collusion, and
other violations of fair competition in the economic marketplace must be
guarded against, so must electoral fraud and political corruption. If the
system is to aggregate personal preferences in a way that treats everyone
equally, then someone will have to hold the authority to proscribe cheating
and to punish those who do not play fair. Fair play in politics thus requires
neutral officials to ensure that the competition takes place on the equivalent of a level playing field. Political competition shares this reliance on
fair play with competition in both the marketplace and the sporting field.
What, then, are the implications of this preference-aggregation conception of democracy for the understanding of mass incarceration? The
answer turns entirely on the preferences of the voters. Whether rates of
incarceration are or are not excessive, according to this conception, will
depend upon what the voters hope to accomplish by imprisoning offenders. Economic considerations surely will come into play here, for anyone
who believes that prisons are necessary or desirable responses to crime
will want them to operate efficiently. Other things being equal, the voters
will prefer not to go to the extra expense of building more prisons to accommodate more prisoners. But they may also decide that the perceived
gains in personal safety or the satisfaction of exacting retribution are worth
the extra expense. These preferences may well lead them to vote for politicians who continue to insist on the tough-on-crime policies that lead
to mass incarceration. Penal populism is thus fully at home within the
preference-aggregation conception of democracy.
Taking democracy to be a cooperative venture in pursuit of a common
good, however, produces a much different result. On this conception,
the voter is expected to act as a citizen rather than a consumer, and democracy is less a matter of eliciting personal preferences than of evoking civic judgments. The two considerations, however, are not mutually
exclusive. Like the preference-aggregation conception, the cooperativeventure understanding of democracy holds that everyone's interests are
to be accorded equal consideration, and every member of the polity
should have opportunities to express his preferences. But the cooperative-venture conception also holds that citizens should look beyond
their personal preferences to what is good or best for the polity as a
whole. This conception thus accords with the belief that every citizen
holds office or, as John Stuart Mill put the point, stands in a position of
public trust. 31
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Both conceptions share, as I have noted, a commitment not only to
equality but to fairness. On either conception, democracy requires electoral
competition, and that competition must proceed in accordance with regulations that ensure the fair conduct of elections. However, the cooperativeventure conception does not stop at this point; for competition itself must
be understood as an element of what is a fundamentally cooperative enterprise. We may be tempted to think of competition in the marketplace or
the sporting arena as a matter of winning at all costs, but it is nevertheless
true that unbounded competition will lead to the destruction of both the
market and the sport. If all that matters is winning, then there is no reason
not to cheat and steal at every opportunity, and even to dispense with those
whose office is to protect personal property or to uphold the rules of the
game. In such cases, though, property rights will count for nothing and
the game will no longer be recognizable as baseball or cricket or football.
In such cases, both markets and sports will degenerate into something resembling Hobbes's state of nature. To av<?id this outcome, the participants
must find ways to underpin their competition with a cooperative commitment to playing fair-a commitment that includes the appointment of officials whose duty is to elaborate and enforce the rules of fair play.
This cooperative commitment also includes a commitment to regard
the other participants as contributors to a common enterprise. We have
a duty to treat them fairly, therefore, and encourage reciprocity on their
parts. In a democracy, according to the cooperative-venture conception,
there is a corresponding duty to regard every member of the polity as a
potential contributor to the cooperative enterprise of self-government.
There is also a duty to encourage reciprocity and to promote the virtues
of citizenship among the members. In Rawls's terms this is "a natural
duty of civility," which requires citizens, among other things, "not to
invoke the faults of social arrangements as a too ready excuse for not
complying with them, nor to exploit inevitable loopholes in the rules to
advance our interests." 32 In order to sustain the cooperative enterprise, in
other words, we must play fair even when personal advantage would have
us do otherwise. Because we cannot count on everyone always to play fair,
we need the police and judges and other officials to provide the security
necessary to assure those who are willing to abide by the rules that their
cooperative efforts will not be wasted. But we also need to do what we can
to promote Rawls's natural duty of civility. Other things being equal, willing cooperation is better than coerced.
Another implication of the cooperative-venture conception of democracy has to do with the rules that govern the enterprise. In a democracy,
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these rules are themselves a matter of public choice, and the duty of civility extends to the framing of these rules. Before we enact a law, then,
we must be sure that it is a law that does not impose an unfair burden on
other members of the polity. In the context of this chapter, this means that
we must determine what is to count as a crime in this light. The answer
is clear enough in the standard cases of assault, murder, rape, and robbery, for we do not impose unfair burdens on our fellow citizens when
we proscribe those actions. Indeed, the unfair burdens would fall on the
victims of those crimes, whose suffering would make it difficult, at best, to
continue to play the part of the cooperative citizen. There are many other
activities, however, that democratically elected legislatures have outlawed
even though these activities fall outside the standard cases. Whether they
should or should not be outlawed is a matter to decide, on the cooperativeventure conception of democracy, in light of their bearing on fair play and
civility. Some of these cases should be easy to settle. Suborning witnesses
and threatening judges are actions that strike at the rule of law, and any
burden that anyone suffers as a result of their proscription is hardly an
unfair burden. Mala prohibita offenses, such as those involving traffic and
environmental regulations, are likely to be justified as a means of ensuring cooperation in a collective enterprise; but if it becomes clear that the
proscription in question places an unfair burden on some members of the
polity, then either the proscription should be altered or the activity in question should be allowed.
From the standpoint of the cooperative-venture conception, in short, the
question is not whether the aggregated preferences of the people, either
directly or through their elected representatives, should or should not designate a certain activity as criminal. The question, instead, is whether the
activity in question inhibits the fair play of the democratic game. If it does,
then the question becomes one of efficacy-in other words, whether the
criminal sanction is the best way to deal with those actions that interfere
with democratic fair play or whether there are better alternatives. If the
activity in question poses no threat to democratic fair play, then it should
not be proscribed. In some cases this approach leads to straightforward
decisions. For instance, anyone who proposes to make a crime of some
form of sexual activity between consenting adults would have to show that
the activity in question poses a serious threat to democracy understood as
a cooperative venture, and that will be a difficult case to make. In many
cases, though, the decision will not be at all straightforward. One could
argue, for instance, that the production or consumption of any drug that
renders people incapable of fair play or of carrying out their duties of
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civility should be a crime. Couched in those terms, the proposal is perfectly acceptable under the cooperative-venture conception of democracy.
But those who are charged with determining what is to count as a crime
would then have to make an informed judgment as to which drugs, if any,
do in fact have those antidemocratic and unfair propensities. Once they
have identified such drugs, if any, they would then have to make the further
determination of whether the criminal sanction is the appropriate way to
deal with the problem and, if it is, whether a blanket prohibition or a more
limited response is better. In the case of alcohol, there is little doubt that
its consumption at some point inhibits civility and the sense of fair play.
Laws against public drunkenness and enhanced punishment for those who
harm or endanger others while drunk, though, seem likely to address the
problem more effectively than outright prohibition of the production, sale,
or consumption of alcohol. Nor would such laws place an unfair burden on
anyone, such as those who consume alcohol without endangering anyone
or threatening democratic fair play. Exte~ding this reasoning to drugs that
are widely proscribed at present would almost certainly result in a dramatic reduction of drug crimes and a similar reduction in the prison population. Such a change by itself would not be enough to solve the problem
of mass incarceration in the United States, but it surely would be a major
step in that direction.
In this way the conception of democracy as a cooperative venture reinforces my earlier point about the connection between fair play and the
reduction of the number of actions and activities that should be designated criminal. The conception also speaks to the concern that too many
criminals are being imprisoned and too many are being imprisoned for
too long. If the polity is a cooperative venture, then it is perfectly reasonable to discourage its members from engaging in actions that harm
those whose law-abiding conduct sustain the venture or otherwise threaten
to undermine it. It is also reasonable to punish those who have, despite
the discouragement, committed such acts. Except in extraordinary cases,
however, the aim should be to restore the offenders to full participation
in the democratic venture, not to banish them forever. Again, there will
be difficult judgments to make about whether imprisonment is the proper
sentence for certain offenses and, if it is, how long the term should be.
Even so, there is little doubt that the lengthy sentences that have contributed to the explosion of the prison population in the United States cannot
be justified under the cooperative-venture conception of democracy. Such
sentences unfairly burden those on whom they are imposed, and they do
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nothing to restore the offender to a place in society as a full participant in
the cooperative venture.
With that point in mind, I return briefly to the controversy over the
disenfranchisement of felons. 33 One issue here concerns whether imprisonment for a criminal offense should ever carry with it the loss of the
offender's vote. In my view, as I stated earlier, it should. There are some
cases-treason, electoral fraud, and attempting to bribe officers of the law
are clear examples-in which loss of the vote seems appropriate because
the offender has directly threatened the cooperative venture of the polity.
But depriving the offender of the franchise is also fitting in the case of
any offense serious enough to be considered a felony. Even if the offense
is arson or burglary or some other crime that has no direct bearing on the
conduct of elections or the functions of the government, it nevertheless
constitutes a significant violation of fair play and civility. In addition to
his imprisonment, then, the criminal should suffer a loss of status. He has
breached a civic trust, and it is only fair that he surrender his vote as a
result. This is not to say that the convicted criminal should be treated as
an outcast who is altogether excluded from the polity. But neither should
he be regarded as a member in good standing. In keeping with the communicative aspect of punishment, this diminution of his civic status should
be reflected in the temporary loss of a fundamental civic or political right.
Once again, however, the aim should be to restore him to full participation
in the democratic venture, which entails the restoration of the franchise
when he has completed his sentence. To do otherwise would be to impose
an unfair burden on him while doing nothing to promote the spirit of democratic fair play among others. 34

Fair Play and the Educated Democracy
Earlier in this chapter I quoted Tocqueville's remark, in his introduction to
the first volume of Democracy in America, that it is necessary to educate
democracy. By this Tocqueville meant that, if we are to live in a society
governed by the common people-as he thought was inevitable-then
it behooves the leaders of society to take measures that will prepare the
people to govern democratically. Put simply, this education must comprise
not only the standard subjects taught in schoolhouses but also education
in the responsibilities of democratic citizenship. For this latter sort of education, the schoolhouse would be insufficient. Other venues, such as the
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town meeting and the courthouse, where citizens would sit in jury duty,
would help to complete this education in democracy. 35
Another way to put Tocqueville's point is to say that democracy is
a matter of self-government in two senses of that word. It is, first, selfgovernment in the sense that the people rule. But this is not to be the kind
of rule in which the people, as a collective, simply do whatever they please,
so that democracy becomes the tyranny of the majority that Tocqueville
feared. It must also be self-government in the sense that the people govern
themselves-that is, exercise self-restraint-in a thoughtful, prudent
manner. In the terms of this chapter, that self-restraint, or self-government,
is largely a matter of respecting the rule of law-laws that are to be made
publicly, to serve the public good-and the principle of fair play. But that
is not to say that self-government is a kind of altruism. Every citizen has
a right to care for her own interests and to demand equal consideration of
those interests from her fellows. That much the cooperative-venture conception of democracy shares with the p~eference-aggregation model. But
equality of consideration requires her to extend this same consideration to
all of the others. When she votes or otherwise contributes to the making
of laws and policies, then, the citizen is to do so in a way that accords this
equal respect to all citizens. She must, in short, act on the principle of fair
play by bearing her share of the burdens of social cooperation and imposing no more than a fair share on others.
Republican theory also contributes to an educated democracy through
its traditional emphasis on vigilance. As Philip Pettit notes in an essay that
brings republicanism to bear on issues in criminal law, a vigilant citizenry
has long been held to be necessary to the health and safety of the body politic; for "the citizenry should be ever vigilant of public power and be ready
to contest and challenge it at the slightest suspicion or sign of abuse." 36
To Pettit's observation I would add that the citizens' vigilance ought to
be aimed not only at those who hold positions of formal authority but
also at themselves. Citizenship itself is a kind of public office, and failure
to play fair with one's fellow citizens should count as an abuse of public
power. An educated democracy is one that takes the task of encouraging
this kind of civic vigilance seriously. It will look, therefore, to its political,
legal, and educational institutions-to these and other civic institutionsto foster a citizenry that is vigilant in maintaining fair play within the
polity. In particular, to return to a passage of Albert Dzur's quoted at the
beginning of this chapter, citizens must "be vigilant to the possibility that
their laws are unfairly burdening some over others." 37 Their laws, that is,
and the forms of punishment that support and follow from them, must
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respect the principle of fair play, and the citizenry must be self-policing in
this regard.
As the evidence of excessive incarceration suggests, the United States is
not the educated democracy it should be. There is reason, though, to hope
and work for improvement. Particularly encouraging in this regard are the
results of a "deliberative poll" on issues in criminal justice that James
Fishkin and his colleagues conducted in England-results that showed an
overall shift from simple get-tough-on-crime attitudes toward the more
flexible and less harsh responses that criminologists tend to favor. 38 If this
small experiment in educating democracy is truly indicative of what more
thorough efforts could achieve, then there is reason to believe that penal
populism need not be a lasting curse of democracy in America.
Another reason to be hopeful is the simple recognition that there are
plenty of other democracies in the world, few of which seem to be following the United States' example with regard to mass incarceration. In 2006,
for example, incarceration rates "across the developed world ... ranged
from 36 per 100,000 (in Iceland) to 737 in the USA, with England and
Wales, at a rate of 148, ... having one of the highest incarceration rates in
the EU." 39 Exactly how to account for these differences is a matter I must
leave to social scientists. But there are two points worth noting here, for
both connect rather directly to fairness. The first is the single-member,
simple-plurality system of electing representatives to most officesnational, state, and local-in the United States. This is not only a respect in
which the United States differs from most other democracies; it also seems
to be related to higher rates of incarceration than those found in democracies that employ proportional representation. 40 The single-member system
also plays a large part in the artful redistricting that makes representation
in the United States less than democratic or fair. 41
The second point to note is that economic inequality in the United
States is generally greater than in other advanced democracies-and the
gap between rich and poor continues to grow. 42 Whether there is a direct
connection between economic inequality and mass incarceration is not
clear. It is clear, however, that the poor in the United States account for
a disproportionately high percentage of both the victims of crime and of
those who commit crimes. 43 If nothing else, these figures suggest that there
are likely to be better ways to address the problems of crime-ways that
speak to the fairness and cooperative nature of the polity-than that of
locking up as many offenders as possible.
There is, of course, something paradoxical in taking the existence of
proportional representation and lesser degrees of economic inequality in
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other democracies to be a hopeful sign for the United States. There are,
after all, great obstacles in the way of the adoption of proportional representation or a reduction of economic inequality in the United States.
Nevertheless, they provide focal points for those who would work to educate democracy in America. They also indicate that the fair-play approach
has something to contribute to the practice as well as the theory of criminal
justice.
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